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INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORM*
William Murden**
I would like to provide a few informal remarks on the U.S.
Treasury's perspective on international issues and discuss some
of the issues we have been addressing in the Group of Seven ("G-
7") and "G-22 processes." I want to touch on three separate, but
related, issues in chronological order: first, the run-up to the Asia
crisis; second, the Asia crisis itself and what we refer to as the
"Halifax II process" or "G-22 process"; and third, the follow-up
to that, which we are referring to as the international financial
architecture process.
For the last several years, the U.S. Treasury and other
finance ministries in the G-7 countries have been interested in
financial crisis issues and how to deal with them. Beginning in
1995 with the Mexico crisis, we discussed this topic at the annual
economic summit in Halifax, Nova Scotia in Canada.'
Subsequently, at the economic summit in Lyons, France, we
started focusing on financial regulatory issues with a two-track
approach: the first on industrial countries, the second on
emerging markets.
In the industrial countries area, which we refer to as "the
financial stability" topic, we looked at the role of international
* This speech was originally presented at the Derivatives and Risk
Management Symposium on Stability in World Financial Markets, held at
Fordham University School of Law on January 28, 1999.
** Director, U.S. Treasury, Office of International Banking and Securities
Markets. The remarks made by Mr. Murden are his own and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Treasury Department.
1. See, e.g., Bob Davis, Peter Gumbel and Rick Wartzman, Disputes
Between G-7 Nations Crowd Out Big Issues at Summit, WALL ST. J., June 19,
1995 at A2 (noting that one of the results of the 1995 meeting of the G-7 in
Halifax was its call for the IMF to set up an "Emergency Financing
Mechanism" to permit quick approval of loans to countries facing large scale
financial crises).
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financial conglomerates. We particularly examined the issues of
very large international financial institutions that operate across
functional lines, in banking, securities, and insurance, as well as
across geographic lines in the United States, Europe, Japan, and
elsewhere, and how best to supervise those industries and
modernize our system of regulation in line with the underlying
markets. Since a single global financial regulator is not a feasible
idea from our point of view due to sovereignty concerns, we had
to look at the problem in terms of promoting regulatory
cooperation and information exchange among regulators to
address the implications of the operations of these larger firms.
The second track was on emerging markets and the recognition
that strengthening supervision was critically important to avoid
banking crises and financial instability in emerging markets.
Estimates of the cost of banking crises in various countries have
ranged from several percent of GDP to fifteen or twenty percent
of GDP.
The G-7 established a working group following the Lyons
Summit in 1996 which consisted of finance ministries and central
bankers from several key industrial countries and emerging
markets along with representatives of other international
organizations, such as the IMF, the World Bank, the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision, and the International
Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"). This
working group issued a report in April 1997, in time for the 1997
Denver Summit.2 The report looked at some of the problems in
the financial sectors in emerging markets, considered the key
elements of a robust financial system, and recommended a
concerted strategy for improving the financial sectors and
financial supervision in these economies, including a more in-
depth role by the IMF and the World Bank in the financial
sector. Out of that process came some very significant
developments, including the Basle Committee's Core Principles
2. TiE WORUNG PARTY ON FINANCIAL STABILITY IN EMERGING MARKET
ECONOMIES, FINANcIAL STABILrrY IN EMERGING IARKET ECONOMIES (1997).
This report is available from participating institutions and on the website of
the Bank of International Settlements at <http://www.bis.org>.
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for Effective Banking Supervision,3 which were released later
that fall and served as a guideline for most of the emerging
markets in terms of improving their system. A year later, IOSCO
issued a similar set of principles.
4
Unfortunately, we did not have time to implement the
strategy before the Asia crisis erupted in the summer of 1997 in
Thailand and quickly spread to Indonesia and Korea by that fall.
But by the spring of 1998 we realized, along with the G-7
countries and others, that we should look at the lessons learned
from the Asia crisis and how we might better deal with crises that
erupt in the future. Although we can never totally eliminate
crises, we can reduce their risk and increase the resilience of the
international financial system.
In the spring of 1998, Secretary Robert Rubin of the U.S.
Treasury and Chairman Alan Greenspan of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank convened and chaired a
special meeting of twenty-two countries' finance ministers and
central bank governors. This became known as the "Halifax II"
process, based on the original "Halifax I" process after the
Mexico crisis. Because twenty-two countries participated, it also
received the nickname of "G-22." Since then more than twenty-
two countries have been involved, so we do not use that term
anymore.
The ministers agreed to establish three working groups to
address some of the key problems and solutions to the Asia crisis.
The first group focused on transparency and accountability
3. BASLE COMM. ON BANXNG SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR
EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION (1997) [hereinafter BASLE CORE PRINCIPLES].
4. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (IOSCO),
INTERNATIONAL DISCLOSURE STANDARDS FOR CROss-BORDER OFFERINGS AND
INITIAL LISTINGS BY FOREIGN IssuERs (1998) [hereinafter IOSCO CORE
STANDARDS.] See A Resolution of the President's Committee on IOSCO
Endorsement of Disclosure Standards to Facilitate Cross-Border Offerings and
Listings by Multinational Issuers, IOSCO (Sept. 1998) <http://www.iosco.orgl
resolutions/resolutions-documentl7.html> (resolving to endorse the IOSCO
CORE STANDARDS and recommending that its members take all steps necessary
and appropriate to adopt them). The SEC has proposed revisions to its Form
20-F used by foreign private issuers which incorporate the IOSCO Core
Standards. International Disclosure Standards, Securities Act Release No.
33,7637, 69 S.E.C. Docket 6 (Feb. 2,1999).
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issues, for private financial institutions as well as governments
and international institutions such as the IMF and the World
Bank. The second group considered strengthening financial
systems, similar to the earlier work on emerging markets but
including industrial countries. The third group examined
international crises, which involved work on debtor-creditor
relations, improving bankruptcy regimes, and actually working
through the crises.
Each working group released a report in early October I
will speak briefly on the Working Group Report on
Strengthening Financial Systems. Some of the conclusions and
weaknesses identified are perhaps self-evident.
In Asia, after a considerable amount of work and discussions
among a large number of people, and visits and discussions with
the countries affected, we identified a series of weaknesses in the
financial sector. There is obviously inadequate supervision of the
banks in those countries, inadequate prudential standards and
regulation, practices of directed and connected lending, poor
credit culture, and poor risk management. Other problems
include substandard internal controls in the banks, poor
regulatory reporting, poor public disclosure, bad practices by
banks in the corporate sector, implicit government guarantees
and bailouts of the banking system liabilities, and heavy reliance
on short-term bank debt. These were significant factors in the
five Asian countries most significantly affected by the crisis.
In the Working Group Report on Strengthening Financial
Systems, we took a three-pronged approach to try to address
some of these weaknesses: The first prong was to recognize the
need for international standards in many more areas. We have
the Basle Core Principles, 6 and now the IOSCO Core Standards,7
but we also recognized the need to complete the formulation of
5. WORKING GROUPS OF THE G-22, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
TRANSPARENCY AND AccorTArLrry (1998); WORKING GROUPS OF THE G-22,
REPORT OF THE WORI~NG GROUP ON STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS (1998)
[hereinafter REPORT ON STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS]; WORKING
GROUPS OF THE G-22, REPORT OF TH WORKING GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL CRJSES (1998).
6. BASLE CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 3.
7. IOSCO CoRE STANDARDS, supra note 4.
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International Accounting Standards8 and for OECD to finish its
work on corporate governance standards.9 Presently, the Basle
Committee is examining standards in risk management, asset
valuation, and payment systems.
The second prong, in addition to adopting standards or
developing standards, is to convince countries to actually
implement them. This is a more difficult subject due to countries'
sovereignty. There was quite a bit of discussion on promoting
these standards and developing incentives, and the work in this
area is still ongoing.
Finally, how do we do a better job of monitoring and
ensuring that countries in fact are complying with these
standards? Again, this is still ongoing work, but there are some
areas of agreement, such as having the IMF monitor countries'
compliance with these standards as part of their annual
surveillance. Following the report of these three working groups,
the G-7 leaders and finance ministers issued a sort of "next-steps
statement" on October 30, 1998. This statement covers our work
agenda between now and the Cologne Summit. More
importantly, it is a mandate for finance ministries to work with
their central bank colleagues to explore the scope for
strengthening prudential supervision in the industrial countries,
including looking at the implications of highly leveraged
institutions and offshore centers, and then strengthening financial
systems in emerging markets.
This has generated quite a bit of work, particularly in
reference to the hedge fund issues addressed by this Symposium.
In addition to the President's Working Group on Financial
8. The International Accounting Standards are developed and published
by the International Accounting Standards Committee [hereinafter IASC]. See
IASC, Current Standards (last visited Aug. 3, 1999) <http://www.iasc.org.uk/
frame/cen2.htm>. The objective of the IASC is to "achieve uniformity in the
accounting principles that are used by business and other organizations for
financial reporting around the world." IASC, Home Page (last visited Aug. 3,
1999) <http:lwww.iasc.org.uklframelcenO.htm>.
9. OECD PRINcIPLES OF CoRPoRATE GOVERNANcE, OECD Doc.
SG/CG(99)5 (Apr. 19,1999).
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Markets, which is looking at hedge funds," a number of
international groups are doing that as well, as you heard this
morning. The Basle Committee Working Group is releasing a
report today.1 IOSCO has now started a report on hedge funds.'
The G-10 Committee on the Global Financial System (formerly
the Euro-Currency Standing Committee) is working on this issue
as well.
That brings us up to date. I am going to stop here and let my
colleagues talk more about this subject.
10. The President's Working Group on Financial Markets released its
report on April 29, 1999, entitled Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of
Long-Term Capital Management. See Statement on the Report of the Working
Group on Financial Markets, 35 WEEKLY CoMP. Pans. Doc. 763 (May 3, 1999)
(statement of President William J. Clinton) (welcoming the report and
describing its recommendations as "an important step in our efforts to
promote more secure financial markets.").
11. BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANKS' INTERAcTONS wrrH
HIGHLY LEVERAGED INSTITTIONS (1999). This report was issued
simultaneously with BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SOUND PRACTMCES
FOR BANKS' INTERAcTIONS WITH HIGHLY LEVERAGED INSTITUTIONS (1999). See
Press Release, Banks' Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institutions, Basle
Comm. On Banking Supervision (Jan. 28, 1999) <http://www.bis.org/
press/index.htm> (reporting that the two reports were issued in response to
recent financial market developments, including the near collapse of LTCM).
12. See Press Communique, IOSCO (Feb. 4, 1999) <http://www.iosco.org/
press/presscomm990204.html> (reporting that the Technical Committee of
IOSCO has established a "Task Force on hedge funds and highly leveraged
institutions.").
